While reading your latest posts on the anti-gun antics taking place in Knoxville, I was thinking about our courts, and sent the message below to my correspondents. I discovered something interesting, though; a court decision which appears to invalidate the “Interstate Commerce” justification for licensing firearms dealers. I wonder if any of your readers may have knowledge of this?
Quote: A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution. Thus, it may not exact a license tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 56-58, 60 S.Ct. 388, 397, 398, 128 A.L.R. 876
CarlS
—– Original Message —–
Changing Moral Values and Criminal Courts
Moral relativism is nothing new. The courts have practiced it continuously since about, oh, 1936. How else to explain why the Supreme Court once ruled, repeatedly, that every man has a birthright to own and carry firearms without a license, that a state may not impose a charge, license, or fee for the exercise and enjoyment of a religious or (any) right, versus these craven rulings now which emasculate the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and other Amendments? Absent relativism, the courts would have to publicly state that a Court was wrong, either then or now. And once they admit the court is not infallible, why should anyone adhere to their rulings?
We have civil and we have criminal courts. Why is right and wrong judged differently in these venues? Why is it that juries most often interpret the law in civil actions, whereas judges do the interpreting in criminal actions? Why is it that judges refuse to allow the words “jury nullification” to be used in courtrooms? Is there another reason why we have “Criminal” courts? Hence my conclusion that any court which does not hold firm to the written Constitution, any court which “interprets” the Constitution, is itself a criminal court. Q.E.D.
Carl Shires
—– QUOTE TO REMEMBER —–
In philosophy, moral relativism takes the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect absolute and universal moral truths, but instead make claims relative to social, cultural, historical or personal circumstances. Moral relativists hold that no universal standard exists by which to assess an ethical proposition’s truth. Relativistic positions often see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or in the context of individual preferences. Moral relativism differs from moral pluralism and from value-pluralism — which acknowledges the co-existence of opposing ideas and practices, but accepts limits to differences, such as when vital human needs get violated. Moral relativism, in contrast, grants the possibility of moral judgments that do not such accept such limits.
From Wikipedia
REFERENCE: U.S. SUPREME COURT, MURDOCK V. PENNSYLVANIA 319 US 105 (1942)
………. We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, the payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44, 45 S., 54 S.Ct. 599, 601, and cases cited. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part of the vital power of the press which has survived from the Reformation. It is contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant [319 U.S. 105, 113] if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax – a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution. Thus, it may not exact a license tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce (McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 56-58, 60 S.Ct. 388, 397, 398, 128 A.L.R. 876), although it may tax the property used in, or the income derived from, that commerce, so long as those taxes are not discriminatory. Id., 309 U.S. at page 47, 60 S.Ct. at page 392, 128 A.L.R. 876 and cases cited. A license tax applied to activities guaranteed by the First Amendment would have the same destructive effect. It is true that the First Amendment, like the commerce clause, draws no distinction between license taxes, fixed sum taxes, and other kinds of taxes. But that is no reason why we should shut our eyes to the nature of the tax and its destructive influence. The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down.
I’m no lawyer but I’m pretty sure taxing a right is illegal (poll taxes, for example). Thoughts?