This is the very reason we shouldn’t be using drones. A man in the cockpit is a BIT harder to take control of. Let’s not forget that Iran has one of our advanced drones and has been taking it apart for months now.
I wouldn’t bet a nickle on anything RT says being true (ever!) without independent verification, though. I’m willing to believe this one because it’s inherently plausible, but still… RT?
Deeply dubious source in my experience. It’s run by the Russian government, after all.
(It also says: Correction: this story has been modified to clarify that the drone used in the U of T experiment was not a government drone, but a UAV owned by the university.
Last I heard military GPS had an encryption layer that makes that very hard.
I’d bet a dollar that DHS drones use the military stuff and the attack, which appears to be just “overloading the real GPS signal with a locally broadcast lie” wouldn’t work very well there…)
Most mil-spec GPS systems have the ABILITY to decrypt an encrypted feed from the sats. As far as I know, the encryption must come from the birds and that has been turned off for years.
Not that it matters much, many of our drones communicate to the controllers in the clear.
I’m willing to bet that particular drone was not using a GPS system with selective availability anti-spoofing module (SASSM) capability.
People above me were kind of hitting around the mark but not quite tagging the bullseye.
In a SASSM GPS system (which is required on all military GPS systems now) there are basically two things going on. There’s the ability to overcome the selective availability position errors, which is becoming less and less important as it appears SA will never be turned back on for a variety of reasons. Secondarily there’s a satellite authentication protocol which is used in an anti-spoofing role. That satellite authentication makes it REALLY hard to spoof a SASSM receiver as I understand it…
There is still hope. A man in a cockpit, or a man in a uniform, can question illegal/immoral orders. A drone is a machine that questions nothing — it will relay information or death in nanoseconds.
June 29th, 2012 at 12:13 pm
How long before schematics for this are all over the Internets?
June 29th, 2012 at 12:18 pm
Probably already there.
This is the very reason we shouldn’t be using drones. A man in the cockpit is a BIT harder to take control of. Let’s not forget that Iran has one of our advanced drones and has been taking it apart for months now.
Yeah, I feel really damn safe.
June 29th, 2012 at 1:43 pm
How long till someone takes down the police drones? Heck, who wants to keep score?
June 29th, 2012 at 1:52 pm
Maybe yes, maybe no.
I wouldn’t bet a nickle on anything RT says being true (ever!) without independent verification, though. I’m willing to believe this one because it’s inherently plausible, but still… RT?
Deeply dubious source in my experience. It’s run by the Russian government, after all.
(It also says: Correction: this story has been modified to clarify that the drone used in the U of T experiment was not a government drone, but a UAV owned by the university.
Last I heard military GPS had an encryption layer that makes that very hard.
I’d bet a dollar that DHS drones use the military stuff and the attack, which appears to be just “overloading the real GPS signal with a locally broadcast lie” wouldn’t work very well there…)
June 29th, 2012 at 7:56 pm
Sigivald,
Most mil-spec GPS systems have the ABILITY to decrypt an encrypted feed from the sats. As far as I know, the encryption must come from the birds and that has been turned off for years.
Not that it matters much, many of our drones communicate to the controllers in the clear.
July 1st, 2012 at 10:29 pm
I’m willing to bet that particular drone was not using a GPS system with selective availability anti-spoofing module (SASSM) capability.
People above me were kind of hitting around the mark but not quite tagging the bullseye.
In a SASSM GPS system (which is required on all military GPS systems now) there are basically two things going on. There’s the ability to overcome the selective availability position errors, which is becoming less and less important as it appears SA will never be turned back on for a variety of reasons. Secondarily there’s a satellite authentication protocol which is used in an anti-spoofing role. That satellite authentication makes it REALLY hard to spoof a SASSM receiver as I understand it…
July 2nd, 2012 at 12:04 pm
Actually, yes, I feel safer knowing this.
A geek and a laptop beats Leviathan.
There is still hope. A man in a cockpit, or a man in a uniform, can question illegal/immoral orders. A drone is a machine that questions nothing — it will relay information or death in nanoseconds.